Pricing Strategies in Revenue Management
with Multiple Firms Competing for Customers
Yue (Diana) Dai
Industrial Engineering and Operations Research,
North Carolina State University
Authors: Yue Dai, Xiuli Chao, Shu-Cherng Fang and
Henry L.W. Nuttle
We consider the pricing
strategies of multiple firms providing same service and competing for a
common pool of customers in a revenue management context. The demand at
each firm depends on the selling prices charged by all firms, each of which
satisfies demand up to a given capacity limit. We use game theory to analyze
the systems when firms face either a deterministic demand or a general
stochastic demand. The existence and uniqueness conditions of a Nash equilibrium
are derived, and we calculate the explicit Nash equilibrium point when
the demand at each firm is a linear function of price. We also conduct
sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium prices with respect to cost and
capacity parameters.